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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EDMUND E. GREENWELL,
Pla.intiff arnd Respondent,
Case
No. 8961

-vs.-

R. C. DUVALL,
Defendant and Appellarnt.

RESPO·NDENT''S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellant has devoted considerable space in his brief
to a statement of the background and facts in regard
to the matter before the Court. In reading this statement,
the Court may recall the case of Douglas v. Duvall, where
the appeal was taken by the Plaintiff from an adverse
ruling by a jury. The Court's decision is reported in
5 Utah 2d 429, 304 P. 2d 373. That case is related to this
case in that they both involve the same Defendant and
arise from the transactions relating to the financing of
the operations of the Duvall Mine. There is, however, a
marked difference in the two claims which, as the Court
1
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will perceive, amply explains why the Plaintiff in the previous case may have lost while the Plaintiff in the instant
case was successful. The Plaintiff Frank Douglas in the
other case commenced making loans to the Duvall Company in the Spring of 1950, prior to the time the mine was
put in operation. At that time the engineering reports,
which the Defendant relied upon as showing his good
faith and which he testified were shown to the Plaintiff
Douglas, indicated the presence of 200,000 tons of '' proven and probable ore reserves having values of about $7.00
per ton.'' The estimate given in the report for mining
and milling costs totaled $3.28 per ton which on the basis
of a 90% recovery would leave a profit of $3.02 per ton or
$6,004.00 for the ore body investigated.
In its opinion the Court comments upon the jury's
verdict as follows :
''Significant facts which support such conclusion
included an inspection by plaintiff, prior to any
loan, of a competent engineer's report and
map showing the mine's location, drilling data,
estimated tonnage, production costs and ore
values ... ''
The transaction in the instant matter, however, took
place after three ( 3) years of unsuccessful operation of
the mine - when all of the actual experience of those
years repudiated the engineer's estimates given in January, 1950.
Defendant Duvall testified that upon receiving the
engineering report from Roger Pierce in January 1950
(Defendant's Exhibit 2 in this case) it was determined
2
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to incorporate and proceed to raise funds to build a mill
and operate the mine (Tr. 89-91). The Articles of Incorporation (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) show that the Company
was incorporated for $1,000,000, of which $700,000 was
issued. The issued stock was given to the incorporators
(consisting of Duvall, three members of his family, Fredrick Froerer and Lawrence S. Berrett) in exchange for
the mining properties and the improvements or machinery located thereon. The Duvall interests received 55,000
shares of stock, having a par value of $550,000.
Following incorporation it was necessary to borrow
money to build the mill ( Tr. 23, 89). Initially, $100,000
(not $80,000 as stated in Appellant's Brief) was raised
by borrowing from Frank Douglas and others, including
Defendant Duvall and his associates Froerer and Berrett. (Exhibi~ R) Mr. Duvall testified that only $80;000
was borrowed (Tr. 91) but the actual records disclose
otherwise (which only goes to reflect upon the accuracy
of Appellant's testimony).
Although the Pierce report (Exhibit 2) further
stated that ''it is estimated that to build this plant and
get it into operation approximately $100,000 will be
needed," it turned out that the initial borrowings were
inadequate so that in August, 1950, a so-called ''assess,
ment'' was levied on each stockholder in proportion to
his stock. (Tr. 142) Mr. Duvall, owning by far the greater portion of the stock, was assessed the greatest amount.
The mine and mill were operated from the first of
September until December, 1950. Appellant states "the
3
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recoveries made during the first year's operation were
not good." This is indeed an understatement of the fact.
Exhibit B discloses that for every ounce of gold recovered (worth $35 per ounce) it cost $108.71, without considering any depreciation on the mill and equipment
which had been installed at a cost of approximately
$120,000.
About December 14, 1950, Mr. Romney prepared a
schedule of the mill tonnage and precipitate shipments
for the year 1950 (Exhibit D). This was received by Mr.
Duvall about that time (Tr. 25-27). From this Exhibit
(as well as the verbal testimony of the various parties
concerned with the operation of the mine) it appears that
the average assay of the ore being mined was .15 ounces
of gold per ton, which at the value of $35 per ounce
would be approximately $5.25 per ton. However, only
a bout 32.6% of the gold was being recovered so that approximately $1.95 was actually being recovered from
each ton of ore mined (See also Exhibit Y). At the same
time it cost $9.49 per ton to mine the ore so that the company suffered a loss of in excess of $7.50 for every ton
mined (See Exhibit Y). This information was well known
to Defendant, Duvall, who was kept informed from day
to day and week to week as to what was taking place.
(Tr 24, 31, 36) As stated by Mr. Roger Pierce, the engineer, ''Certainly we bumped into troubles the first minute we turned the material over." (Tr. 281)
Because of the loss sustained during the 1950 operating season it was necessary to raise more money to
4
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make changes in the operation and to continue with the
operation. This was done by additional borrowings. As
expressed by Mr. Duvall, "That's the only way we had of
obtaining money." (Tr. 38) Following the close of operation, about December 1, 1950, until May 15, 1951, when the
next year's operation commenced, $55,000 more was borrowed from various individuals. (Plaintiff's Exhibit R)
An income and expense statement prepared for the
Company covering the period September 1, 1950, to
March 31, 1951, discloses that the Company had a total
operating loss of $54,039.79 (Plaintiff's ;Exhibit E). At
that time the capital stock of $700,000 issued and outstanding was impaired by the amount of $54,039.79 and
thus the Company was insolvent. (See Exhibit E) The
records further reveal that the Company thereafter remained insolvent up until the time that operations were
abandoned in the Fall of 1953. (See Exhibits E, K, P, T,
and 13)
Although the per cent of recovery of gold from the
ore was increased in the year 1951 from approximately
32% to 63% the over-all picture of the operation did not
change to any degree. Exhibit F (which contains a summary of the mine operation) discloses that a total of
21,468 tons of ore were processed, averaging .164 ounces
of gold per ton. Converted to dollar value, this would
indicate that the ore being processed would average $5.74
per ton gold content. However, since only 62% of the
gold was being recovered, the actual recovery from the
ore processed was approximately $3.45 per ton (Exhibit
5
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Y). At the same time the costs of operation, including
depreciation and depletion, were $7.48 per ton, leaving
a net loss of $4.03 for every ton mined in that year (Exhibit Y). According to the statement of profit and loss
and balance sheet prepared for the company covering the
period to September 30, 1951, the company had an operating loss of $28,477.92 up to that time without considering any depreciation or depletion. (Plaintiff's Exhibit K)
This Exhibit further reflects the increased insolvency of
the company.
Again at the end of the 1951 season it was necessary to look to further borrowing in order to have money
to be prepared to operate in the 1952 season and to make
such changes as they desired to make in the plant operation. As testified by 1\ir. Duvall there was no source of
revenue other than what might come in from the gold or
from the moneys which were borrowed (Tr. 39). For the
period of operation in 1951 the company received
$7 4,112.19 from gold recovery and the cost of operation (including depreciation and depletion) came to
$160,570.33. The difference between these two figures had
to be made up by borrowings according to :Jir. Duvall
(Tr. 39). Exhibit R discloses that it was apparently
necessary at all times and continually after the company
started operations on September 1, 1950, to engage in
substantial borrowings. From J\iay 15, 1951, until December 1, 1952, a total of $112,558.37 was borrowed, making
a total borrowing of $167,558.37 after the completion of
the plant in the Fall of 1950 and up to December 1,1952.

6
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Of this amount nothing was contributed or loaned by
Mr. Duvall or his associates (Exhibit R).
The 1952 operation was little different from the operation in 1951. The per cent of recovery of gold from
the ore remained about the same ( 62%). Since the ore
assayed about the same as to its gold content, the proceeds per ton remained about the same. The only changes
were in the cost of operation, which increased from $7.48
per ton to $7.98 per ton and the over-all production
from the mine which increased from 21,468 tons to 27,000
tons so that the over-all loss increased substantially, as
did the net loss per ton which increased from $4.03 to
$4.30 per ton (Exhibit Y).
In 1952, a total of $99,539.71 was received from the
sale of the gold recovered from the ore. At the same
time it cost $215,444.54 for operation (including depreciation and depletion) leaving an operating loss for
the period of approximately $115,000 (Exhibit Y).
Again, Mr. Duvall testified that he was aware from.week
to week of the operations of the company during the
1952 season and of the reports showing the gold content
of .the ore being processed as well as the cost of the mining operations. (Tr. 39) Plaintiff's Exhibits M and 0
are interesting in that they disclose that during the years
1951 and 1952 there were daily plant reports prepared
by the company superintendent and furnished to Duvall,
which reports showed the assays of the ore being processed and the recovery therefrom. These reports were
cumulative so that from month to month it was possible

7
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to determine at a moment's glance the total amount of
ore which had been processed up to that time, the assay
content thereon, and the gold recovery therefrom.
At the end of the 1952 season, Mr. Duvall testified,
it was necessary to engage in additional borrowings in
order to put in some new tanks, engage in further stripping operations and for operation expenses generally.
(Tr. 39, 40) Although Appellant states in his Brief
(Page 5) that in the Fall of 1952 it was necessary to
expend over $31,500 for the purchase and installation of
three additional thickener tanks, the records of the company do not support that statement. According to the
records of the company, as analyzed by an independent
certified public accountant, Paul B. Tanner (Exhibit X)
the only expense incurred by the company for additional
plant equipment after October, 1952, was the sum of
$525 paid for freight in the Spring of 1953. There was
one payment of $5,000 in October which Mr. Tanner testified might have been used for the purchase of additional
equipment. (Tr. 236-241)
From the foregoing it would appear that the financial situation of the company as of December 1, 1952, was
rather critical. Apparently it was sufficiently serious
that Mr. Duvall himself felt impelled to put an additional $5,000 into the company. This was the first money
which he had advanced to the company after the original construction of the mill had been completed in the
Fall of 1950 (Exhibit R). His advance was made on December 9, 1952, for which he received a promissory note.
On the same date Francis Cave also loaned the company

8
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$5,000. About this time, Mr. Duvall, who was only casually acquainted with the Plaintiff (Tr. 13), saw Plaintilff at the Weber Club and invited him to come to Defendant's office in the Ogden First Federal Savings and
Loan Association to discuss a matter of business.
At the time of this transaction, he was president
and general manager of the Ogden First Federal Savings and Loan, with which institution he had been associated for over 20 years. (Tr. 13) Defendant, prior to
coming to Ogden and being involved in the Duvall mine
operation, had ten years of experience in oil and gas
exploration and development. ( Tr. 15)
Mr. Duvall testified that when Plaintiff came into
Defendant's office a few days later, Defendant asked
the Plaintiff to make a loan to the Duvall Company.
At that time Defendant testified he was not sure whether
he knew Mr. Duvall had $5,000 on deposit with the Ogden
First Federal. ( Tr. 136). He later denied he knew of
Mr. Greenwell's deposit with the Company. (Tr. 137)
Plaintiff, however, testified that Mr. Duvall asked him
to investment $5,000 in the company. (Tr. 173) This
fact is particularly significant because at that time Mr.
Greenwell had on deposit with the institution of which
Mr. Duvall was president and general manager the
sum of $5,000.
Mr. Duvall further testified that at the time Mr.
Greenwell came into the bank to talk to him that he (Mr.
Duvall) discussed the general operation of the mine with
the Plaintiff. (Tr. 60) When asked if he made any state9
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ment to him with respect to the amount of ore that had
been blocked out, he testified that he showed Mr. Greenwell the report which had been made in January of 1950
by Mr. Pierce and showed him on the report what Mr.
Pierce had stated with respect to this matter. (Tr. 60, 61)
At that time the operating bills of the company were not
paid but this fact was not disclosed to Plaintiff. (Tr. 63)
Following the discussion Mr. Greenwell agreed to
loan the company $5,000 and gave his personal check
therefor. (Tr. 211, Exhibit L) In turn, he received a
promissory note on a form used by the Commercial Security Bank (in which company Duvall was a director).
The Bank's name was crossed out and the name of the
Plaintiff and his wife, as joint tenants with full right
of survivorship, was filled in. This note is dated December 21, 1952, and is a demand note since no future
date for payment is specified. (Exhibit M) Plaintiff was
also given 500 shares of stock which was put in the name
of Plaintiff and his wife as joint tenants with full right
of survivorship (Exhibit V). At the time the loan was
made the Duvall Company was hopelessly insolvent and
unable to pay its bills except from additional borrowings
which were made after Plaintiff's loan in the additional
amount of approximately $30,000. (Exhibits R. T) At
the time it ceased operation it owed substantial sums for
unpaid bills in addition to the unpaid notes of $325,044.17
plus accrued interest. (Exhibits R., T)
During its 3 years of operation the company had
mined 113,409 tons of ore assaying approximately $5.50
per ton, from which it had recovered gold at the rate of
10
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approximately $3.10 per ton of ore for a total income
from operations of $351,250.77. At the same time it had
cost $732,754.51 for operations (which did not include
the cost of the mill and other capital equipment but did
include depreciation thereon of $90,545.37 and $18,590.23
for depletion). (Plaintiff's Exhibits T and Y, and Defendant's Exhibit 13)
POINTS RELIED UPON
Appellant has listed several points for consideration
by this Court in seeking a reversal of the decision of the
lower court. Inasmuch as each of these points has been
separately argued in Appellant's Brief, Respondent will
answer them in the same order, as follows :
I. Alleged error in permitting Plaintiff to amend
his Complaint at the time of trial.
II. Alleged error in denying Defendant's motion to
dismiss at the conclusion of Palintiff's evidence.
III. Alleged error in receiving the testimony of witnesses, Felt, Tansil, Douglas, Foulger and
Shreeve.
IV. Alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the Findings and Judgment.
V. Were the representations found to have been
made actionable as a matter of law~
VI. Alleged insufficiency of the Findings of Fact.
VII. Alleged insufficiency on proof of damages to the
Plaintiff.
11
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ARGUMENT
I. ALLEGED ERROR IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT AT THE
TIME OF TRIAL.

The matter of the amendment to Plaintiff's Complaint was discussed by the Court and counsel at the beginning of the trial. At that time, as counsel for Plaintiff pointed out, the proposed amendment conformed to
the amendments which were theretofore made in the
Douglas Case and which amendments were well known
to Defendant, thereby negativating any surprise on the
part of the latter. As pointed out by Defendant's counsel
at that time:
''Now, this isn't a new proposition. We have
considered this same matter in the previous Douglas case that has been tried and disposed of- and
I might say that in that case the defect -was cured
by amendment, which has never been proposed in
this case." (Tr. P. 3)
After the proposed amendments in the instant case
were read to the court and discussed by counsel, the court
made the following observation:
THE CouRT: Well, I don't think it could take
you by surprise because the conversations you've
had, and the recollection of those conversations,
would be such that that is what is proof, after all is
said and done, and the proofMR. OLMSTEAD: The Douglas case was a completely different case than this.

12
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THE CouRT : Yes, but this case is based upon
certain representations.
MR. OLMSTEAD : Certain alleged representations specified in the complaintTHE CouRT: Growing out of certain conversations at a certain time and certain place.
MR. OLMSTEAD: Right; and in his deposition
he outlined what those representations were, and
now this is a complete departure from that. (Further Argument on Motion)
THE CouRT: Well, I'll overrude the objection
and the amendment may be made to paragraph 4.
I want it made in writing, though. I want it reduced to writing." (Tr. p. 7-8)
Following this discussion, counsel for Defendant did
not make any claim that he was in any way prejudiced
in preparing the case for trial or that by reason of the
amendments being made he would not be able to proceed
with the trial of the case. On the contrary, the facts disclose that he had at all times been aware that technical
amendments made in the Douglas case would of necessity
be made likewise in the instant matter and if the case
had been pre-tried by the court there is no doubt that
such amendments would have been proposed and made
at that time.
Rule 15 (a) U.R.C.P. provides:
''A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading is served or if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and
the action has not been placed upon the trial cal-

13
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endar, he may so amend it at any time within 20
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires.
A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response
to the original pleading or within 10 days after
service of the amended pleading, whichever period
may be the longer, unless the court otherwise
orders." (Emphasis added)
See Davis Stock Company v. Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268
P. 2d 988, where this Court indicated the liberal nature
of this rule at the same time outlining the essential elements which have to be pleaded in a fraud case.
In view of these facts, we respectfully submit that
the trial court did not err in granting Plaintiff's motion
to amend.
II. ALLEGED ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.
As stated by Appellant in this case, Plaintiff's theory
is that he was induced by false and fraudulent representations of the Defendant to make a loan of $5,000 to the
Duvall Company. Appellant in his brief concedes that the
loan was made by Respondent and the record is clear that
the check (Exhibit L) was drawn on Respondent's personal account (Tr. 211). Nowhere is it argued that Plaintiff's wife made the loan or had anything to do with it.
Appellant urges, however, that since the note was made

14
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payable to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's wife ''as joint tenants, with full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants
in common" that Plaintiff is not the proper party to
bring this action.
The law on this point is well stated in 23 Am Jur
Fraud and Deceit, Section 181, page 1000:
''The question as to who may complain of fraud,
other elements existing, is determined by the real
interest of the parties. Thus, the right of one who
trades property for corporate stock to recover for
false representations by the owners of the stock
to recover for false representations by the owners
of the stock as to the amount of the corporate
property is not affected by the fact that some of
the stock is taken in the names of other persons by
his direction.' '
The case of Boddy v. Henry et al., 85 N.W. 771, which
is cited as authority for this statement. involved a situation where the plaintiff had traded some of his real property to defendants in exchange for corporate stock.
When plaintiff took the stock from defendants, he had
some of it made out in the names of members of his family. In answer to the defendant's contentions that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover damages as to this
stock, the court had this to say at page 77 4:
''Some of the stock acquired by the plaintiff in this
transaction was taken in the names of members of
his family, and defendants complain that plaintiff
was not entitled to recover damages for depreciation in the value of such shares, due to misrepresentations as to the quantity of land. But we do
not concur in this view. The entire body of stock

15
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transferred by defendants was so transferred in
consideration of the exchange of plaintiff's property, and his right to recover for any deficiency in
the value of such stock due to misrepresentations
would not be affected by the fact that some of the
stock thus acquired by him was, by his directions,
put into the hands of others.''
The present case involves an identical situation. Respondent here made the loan with his personal check.
The fact that the note was thereafter made out in the
name of Respondent and his wife should not defeat his
right to recover for the damage sustained.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts when faced
with a similar situation made a ruling to the same effect.
See the very recent case of Sarn.dler v. Elliot (1957),
141 N.E. 2d 367. This case involved the purchase of a
franchise by two brothers. One of the brothers subsequently commenced an action to recover the damages he
had suffered as a result of alleged fraud by the seller.
Both brothers did not join as plaintiffs. In fact, at no
place in the pleadings did it appear that the contract involved more than the sellers and the plaintiff. The defendants upon appeal argued that this defect was fatal.
The court, however, did not agree and held the following: (p. 372)
''The omission to allege, or, through references to
the contract, show, that the brother was a 'purchaser' under it does not make the cause different
from that proved. The suit is not for damage to
joint property (the contract) or for joint loss or
for the brother's loss; it is for the for loss caused
to this plaintiff only. The brother is not concerned

16
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in the cause of action for that separate tort. Baker
v. Jewell, 6 Mass. 460, 462. See_ Thompson v. Pentecost, 210 Mass. 223, 228, 96 N.E. 335. Compare
Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete. 246, 257. The plaintiff, as alleged, did 'buy * * * the franchise' ; that
the brother had become a 'purchaser' also in order
to assume obligations to the corporation under the
contract, did not make this legally untrue even if
the brother also had acquired a legal title to the
franchise. If the evidence supporting the view
that the plaintiff had the sole beneficial interest is
accepted, it was a substantively correct allegation
as a matter of fact without qualification.''
Appellant quotes the provisions of Rule 19 (a) and
(b), U.R.C.P., but ignores the provisions of Rule 17 (a)
which provides :
''Every action shall be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest; but ... a party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized
by statute may sue in his own name without joining with him thwparty for whose benefit the action
is brought ... ''
In this case the transaction took place between Plaintiff and Defendant. The representations were made to
Plaintiff and induced him to make the loan. The tort was
committed against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was damaged
by being induced to loan his money. If, however, the
transaction was conducted on behalf of Plaintiff and his
wife, then under the Rule above quoted the party with
whom the contract was made (Plaintiff) for the benefit of
another (himself and wife) ''may sue in his own name
without joining with him the party for whose benefit the
17
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action is brought.'' It must, however, be remembered that
this is not an action on the note, but for damages for
false and fraudulent representations made to Plaintiff
inducing him to make a loan of $5,000 to the Duvall
Company.
III. ALLEGED ERROR IN RECEIVING THE
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES, FELT, TANSIL, DOUGLAS, FOULGER AND SHREEVE.
In the course of the extensive borrowings which it
was necessary to make during the years the company
was in operation, Appellant Duvall had repeated conversations with various other individuals who were induced
to make loans to the company. Several of these individuals appeared as witnesses in the Douglas Case as well as
in the instant matter. In offering first the testimony of
the witness R. D. Tansil (Tr. 213), counsel for Respondent submitted to the Court that the evidence was admissible under the law as stated by McCormick on Evidence, 1954 Edition, Section 164, as follows:
''The policy against proving other misconduct
of a party for the sole purpose of evidencing his
character or disposition as raising the inference
that he was probably guilty of the misconduct
charged in the suit, finds expression in civil as well
as in criminal cases. Where redress for fraud or
misrepresentation is sought, three alternative
theories may be available to support the admissio;n
of evidence of other misrepresentations or fraudulent conduct by the party.
1. When under the applicable substantiYe
law, knowledge or intent by such party is an essen-
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tial ingredient for liability, then if it be proved
that the party has made other misrepresentations,
of similar purport, and false in fact, this tends to
show that the representations in suit were made
with knowledge of their falsity and with intent to
deceive. This inference does not require that the
other representations should have been identical
in purport nor made under precisely like circumstances. Only a reasonable approximation in purport, time and circumstance is needed to ground
the inference of knowledge or intent.
2. If the actual making of the misrepresentations charged in the suit is at issue, then to show
the party's conduct in making the representations
or committing the other acts of fraud as alleged,
it is competent to prove other representations
closely similar in purport or other fraudulent acts,
when they may be found to be parts of a large or
continuing plan or design, of which the acts or misrepresentations in suit may also be found to be an
intended part or object. Similarly, it would
seem that if the identity of the perpetrator of the
fraud in suit were in doubt, then other fraudulent
acts of the party so like the conduct in suit as to
earmark them as the product of the same mind and
hand, would be received to show that he was the
perpetrator.
3. The courts have not generally gone so far,
but it is believed that the admission of evidence of
previous similar misrepresentations to show the
making of the present representations should, in
civil cases at least, be extended to cover the situation where there is testimony asserting the making
of the misrepresentation at issue, and testimony
denying it. Here it seems that evidence in reply
of other like misrepresentations by the party
(whether or not part of a plan or scheme) will be
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of much value to the trier upon the disputed question and that this need outweighs the danger of
prejudice. While su<}h evidence standing alone
would not of course be sufficient to establish the
issue, it can be of great value in resolving the conflict." (Emphasis added)
While the Court did not agree with counsel as to the
third ground for admission quoted above, it did admit
the evidence of these witnesses as to similar statements
made to them on other occasions for the purpose of showing knowledge, intent and motive, as well as indicating
a continuing plan or scheme. The fact that the statements
were made to the witnesses at varying times within 8 to
18 months of the time of the transactions involved with
Respondent does not make the testimony inadmissible, but
goes more to the weight to be given thereto. As stated in
20 Am. Jur. EVIDENCE, Section 339 P. 315:
''It is a common inquiry upon the trial whether a person made a certain statement or committed
a specific act upon a named occasion. It is generally
held, in this conrnection, that proof is admissible to
show that a person said or did something of the
same sort on a differe1zt occasion, provided it
shows the existence of intention, knowledge, or bad
fa.ith upon the occasion in question. Thus, similar
fraudulent acts or representations are admissible
if committed at or about the same time as the one
in question and if the same motive may reasonably
be presumed to have existed, with a view to establish the intent of the defendant in respect of the
matter charged against him. Unless, however, such
collateral acts are shown to be so connected with
the matter in litigation as to make it apparent
that the party to be charged had a common pur20
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pose in both, they are inadmissible. Collateral
proof of knowledge or intention must be limited to
a certain period so that it may naturally throw
light upon the intent with which the act in question was committed. The question. of the period of
time during which other acts may be proved is
largely a matter within the discretion. of the trial
court." (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant recognizes the previous pronouncement by
this Court as contained in Trout a;nd Resort Company v.
Lewis, 41 Utah 183, 125 P. 687, and Smith v. Gilbert, 49
Utah 510, 164 P. 1026. In the latter case the Court discussed the former decision and made the following determination:
"The District Court, in ruling upon the admission of evidence, attempted to be governed by
the rule laid down by this court in the case of
Trout and Resort Co. v. Lewis, 41 Utah 183, 125
Pac. 687, where the rule is stated in the tenth headnote in the following words :
'' 'False representations, similar to the
ones involved in an action, are admissible
where the intent, motive, or knowledge of
their falsity by the party making them are
material, or where it is sought to prove a
system or general plan or scheme to
defraud.'
''The court thus permitted appellant to prove
by other witnesses to whom the plaintiff had sold
some of the capital stock of said corporations
about the time the appellant purchased the stock
in question that the plaintiff had made representations and statements to them to the same effect
as those which appellant testified were made to
him concerning the stock. ''
21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant argues that the testimony of the other witnesses as to statements made to them on other occasions
by the defendant was inadmissible because there was no
proof that such representations were false. In urging
this position Appellant ignores not only the testimony of
Plaintiff's witnesses but the testimony of Defendant's
witnesses, including Defendant himself. The same evidence which supports the claim of Plaintiff that the representations made to him were false also supports the
fact that the same, or similar, representations made to
the witnesses Felt, Tansil, Douglas, Foulger, and Shreeve
were false.
The case of Menefee v. Blitz, 181 Or. 100, 179 P. 2d
550, (cited by Appellant) is clearly not in point. There
the court pointed out that motive and intent were not in
issue in the case so that statements made to third persons would not be admissible to prove the same. In the
instant case every allegation of the complaint with respect to the elements of fraud was denied and put in issue
by the Defendant, including knowledge, intent, and motive (whether Defendant made the statements for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to rely thereon).
The evidence was clearly admissible for the purposes
indica ted by the trial court in allowing it to come in.
IV. ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT.
22
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V. WERE THE REPRESENTATIONS FOUND
TO HAVE BEEN MADE ACTIONABLE AS A
MATTER OF LA:W.
Points 4 and 5 are presented together because they
involve substantially the same problem, to wit: whether
the evidence is sufficient in fact or in law. Respondent
agrees with the statement of law quoted by Appellant
from the case of Paulson v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.
2d 621, as follows: (Appellant's Brief, p. 26)
''The question of whether evidence is sufficient to be clear and convincing is primarily for the
trial court; his finding should not be disturbed
unless we must say as a matter of lmw that no one
could rea.sonably find the evidence to be clear and
convincin.g." (Emphasis supplied)
This Court reached the same conclusion in affirming
the verdict of the jury in the Douglas Case, supra, stating:
''The factual scene here, as reflected in the record,
required submission of the case to the jury, there
being sufficient substantial competent evidence
which, if believed, would sustain the verdict and
preclude us from disturbing it.''
Appellant argues that Plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent. We submit that it was not. For instance,
Plaintiff testified on direct examination that "He also
told me that the bills were paid and that things were in
fine condition." (Tr. 174)
When asked about the same matter on cross-examination he testified :
23
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"Q

Did you know that the company had a then
outstanding indebtedness¥

''A I did not.
''Q

Do you now say that Mr. Duvall said to you,
in substance and effect, that as of that time,
all of the bills were paid¥

''A He did.

'' Q And the company was in fine condition?
"A

That is correct." (Tr. 186)

Plaintiff was then asked about astatement made in
his deposition which counsel apparently thought was in
conflict with his present testimony. In answer to counsel's inquiry, Plaintiff testified further:
''A

I did not know there was any outstanding
bills. I knew nothing about the condition
of the company; only what Duvall told me.''
Tr. 187)
*
*
*
*
*
'' Q Then, your answer as I haTe read it to you,
'I preseumed there was,' was a false answer~ Is that correct?
''A

The only way it could be false to me would
be, if those tanks were on the property,
which I did not know ; or were in transit
or were contemplated. Then, I would not
know, because he asked me for the money
for the cost of the tanks.''

We believe the foregoing points out the firmness with
which Plaintiff testified. While Plaintiff testified, as above
indicated, that Defendant had represented to him that a
loan was necessary in order to purchase certain tanks to
24
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increase production at the mine, the record discloses that
the money was not used for that purpose since no tanks
or other equipment were purchased or paid for then or
later. (Exhibit X) Appellant testified that "It was used
to pay for material, or operating costs; was put in the
general fund of the Duvall Company." (Tr. 127) However, he also testified that he told Plaintiff "that the
shortage of money at the present time was partly occasioned by the fact that we needed to put in those new tanks
to improve the recovery." (Tr. 140) We submit that it
was Appellant who shifted his testimony. In fact, he
repeatedly avoided answering questions directly, whether
the questions were put to him by his own counsel or
by counsel for Plaintiff.
We submit the evidence 1s sufficient to justify the
Findings and Judgment of the trial court. The representations found by the Court to have been made are set out
in the Findings (R. 27) and quoted by Appellant on page
30 of his brief. Appellant claims that the representations
found by the court to have been made are not actionable.
Several Utah cases are cited and quoted from in connection with Appellant's discussion on this point. However,
those cases do not support Appellant's position but are
either distinguishable on the facts or state the law to
be as contended for by Respondent herein. We desire to
discuss the various authorities for the benefit of the
Court.
This Court has on numerous occasions outlined the
basic elements of fraud. See Stuck v. Delta Land and fV a,-
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ter Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791. The question
usually arises whether the misrepresentations are statements of fact or mere conclusions, the general rule being
that in order for a matter to be regarded as a statement
of fact it must have been susceptible to actual knowledge,
it must have been made unqualifiedly, and it must have
been false. The leading Utah case on what constitutes
statements of fact as distinguished from matters of opinion is Campbell v. Zion's Co-op Home Building and Real
Estate Company, 46 Utah 1, 148 P. 401, wherein the Court
held that statements such as "that investors will get handsome returns" and "that their investments will be safe,"
were, under the facts of that case, mere opinions of trade
talk and were not actionable in and of themselves. However, the Court went on to sustain a judgment for the
Plaintiffs because, as it held, there were several statements made by the Defendants which were not mere opinions, but were actionable. We quote from the opinion
at p. 407:
''Such representations, and the statements
made by the defendant's president and secretary
that the dividends had been earned and were justified, relate to material and existing or past
facts .. .
'' ... But the most important statements to
these plaintiffs are those that the defendant had
on hand sufficient money, property. or assets with
which to pay 8 per cent dividends from the start,
and from three to five years, without 'hurting the
financial standing of the company.' and though 'it
did not earn another cent,' and those guaranteeing
a present ability to pay dividends ... On the record, we do not find anything to justify eYen the
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statements made to the plaintiffs purchasing stock
prior to the 'big dividends.' "
Other Utah cases which have discussed the matter
are:

Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 417-18, 48 Pac. 37,
wherein the court said in speaking to this problem of
opinion:
''As a general rule, actionable fraud or misrepresentation consists in a false statement concerning a fact material to the contract, and which
is influential in producing it. Mere statements of
value, made by a vendor, during negotiations between the parties, although known to be excessive,
do not ordinarily constitute either a warranty or
a fraud, unless the peculiar relation of confidence
and trust existing between the parties is such that
the person making the false representations had
reason to believe that the other would rely and act
upon them.''
(The court clearly held that in a situation where a
relationship of confidence existed, the statement as to
value would be actiov.able fraud.)
In Stuck v. Deltd; Larnd and Water Co., 63 Utah 495,
227 P. 791, the court held that where there was a question as to whether a represenattion was fact or opinion,
the jury should determine the issue. After finding that
some of the alleged statements involved were matters of
opinion, the court went on to state :
"However, there is at least one statement in
the circulars that purports on its face to be a rep27
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resentation of fact. It represents Pahvant Valley
to be 'a thoroughly proven general farming district' ... Just what was meant by a 'thoroughly
proven general farming district' is somewhat indefinite, especially as to the nature and character
of the proof ... Whether or not it was a representation of an existing fact upon which the plaintiffs were entitled to rely was, under all the circumstances, a question for the jury to determine.''
A recent case on the subject is Pace v. Parrish, 122
Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273, wherein plaintiffs sued for damages for false representations concerning the extent and
condition of certain farming land. In affirming the judgment, except for one item, this Court held:
"With respect to the misrepresentation as to
the condition of the fences : Plaintiffs' evidence
was that the defendant told them that the property
was fenced and cross-fenced with good fences;
that this was not true; that some of the fences
were in bad disrepair and in fact in places completely down. These places were remote from the
area inspected and because of the difficulties above
mentioned in getting around, we mll not disturb
the jury's finding that this misrepresentation was
false; that the plaintiffs '"ere reasonably entitled
to rely upon it, and accordingly sustain the item
of $100.00 awarded for such defectiYe fences.''
The defendant, Joseph A. Parrish, made certain representations to the effect that a reservoir was upon the
property being sold. He did not state that it "·as owned
by sellers, according to his testimony, but plaintiffs
claimed that he did so represent. The court further held:
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''These representations concerning the reservoir could very well be interpreted to mean that
the defendant owned the reservoir and all of the
water in it and that it went with the place. The
Paces could reasonably rely on these representations, as they did. The fact is that, although the
reservoir was situated within the outside perimeter of the defendants' farm, both the reservoir
and the land it was on belonged to the Northwest
Irrigation Company, and the defendants were
entitled to only one-fourth of the water. Defendants do not claim that plaintiffs knew or were advised of this fact but Mr. Parrish testified: 'If they
had asked me, I would have told them.'
"Defendants suggest that the plaintiffs had
no right to rely on the representations made by
defendant, but were found to make more careful
and complete inquiry concerning such matters. It
is strange and inconsistent for defendants to urge
the necessity for the plaintiffs to cross-examine
Mr. Parrish and to doubt and verify his representations.
"As to reliance in such situations, see 5 Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Sec. 1512. The full
measure of the plaintiffs' duty was to use reasonable care and observation in connection with these
representations. Having done so, it does not lie
in defendant's mouth to say that they were too
gullible and shouldn't have believed him.''
See Baird v. Eflow Investment Co., et aZ., 76 Utah
232, 289 Pac. 112 (1930), where the Court found that defendants had not been guilty of fraud but repeated the
rule that although statements as to value are generally
to be considered as opinions, a statement which is made
29
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under circumstances such as exist in the present case, it
is actionable. We quote :
''It is the general rule that misrepresentations
as to value do not ordinarily constitute fraud, as
they are regarded as mere expressions of opinion
or 'trader's talk' involving matter of judgment
and estimation as to which me nmay differ. 26
C. J. 1215.... For such misrepresentations to be
actionable they must be coupled with concealment
of material facts or with artifice or misrepresentation used to prevent the hearer from learning thE
truth, or be made under such circumstances as tc
indicate that the hearer will rely on them, as wheJ
the truth of the speaker's statement is a contro]
ling element of the transaction, or because conf
dential relations exist. But here nothing of tl
kind appears to take the case out of the operati<
of the general rule respecting such represent
tions." (Emphasis supplied)
In Beaver Drug Co. v. Hatch. 61 Utah 597, 217 Pa
69'5, the court held that a statement to the effect that tl
value of an inventory was $4,000 and that the Defem
ant would guarantee the same was not an expression o
opinion but would support an action in fraud. We quott
from the opinion at 217 Pac. 697:
"It is contended by appellant that whatever
representations were made as to value, if any,
were mere expressions of opinion, and he cites
Mechem on Sales, paragraph 936, in 'vhich it is
stated that where parties deal at arm's length and
on an equal footing, representations concerning
the worth or value of the goods sold will neither
sustain an action nor warrant rescission. This doctrine is unchallenged. HoweYer, it has no applicaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion in the instant case. The representation as to
the price of the goods was not a mere expression of
opinion, but a statement of fact. The statement
was that the goods would inventory $4,000 and
the defendant would guarantee the same. The inventory was to be made within 60 days from the
date of the sale and be made by the Smith-Faus
Drug Co. of Salt Lake City. It was so made and
found to be $1,165.41 less than represented by defendant during negotiation of the sale .... "
The recent case of Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269
P. 2d 865 (1954) involved a situation where a widow and
her daughter purchased a motel on contract from plaintiff, a real estate broker, and motel operator, and attempted unsuccessfully to operate it. When the purchasers became delinquent in their payments, Plaintiff,
seller, sued to recover possession of the motel; and defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging among
other things that the plaintiff had represented the income
of the property to be $1,000.00 per month whereas in fact
it was only $225.00 This Court reversed the decision of
the trial court in favor of the defendant because the trial
court had failed properly to instruct the jury on the matter of reliance on the representations which plaintiff had
made. In doing so, however, the Court made some very
important statements, as follows:
"It is of course true that it must be assumed
that a seller will represent his property at least
in its best light. A ceriain amount of sales talk
or "puffing' must be taken into account and allowed for so long as it does not amount to active
deception or concealment. On the other harnd,. the
wide difference in experience arnd b1,~;siness acumen,
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a.nd the degree to which Mrs. White placed con~
fidence in Mr. Lewis and relied upon his representa.tions are thin.gs which the jury cot~Jld take into
consideration on the question of fraud. The evidence being conflicting on these matters, the trial
court correctly ruled that it was sufficient to warrant submission of the issue of fraud to the jury.''
(Emphasis supplied)

In Ma1yer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P. 2d 611, the
court held that certain stock being sold was treasury stock
of the company, that it was registered and was going to
be sold on 1\fonday to an individual in New York, when
in truth and in fact it was seller's stock, was a sufficient
representation which if made would be actionable.
In Ackerman. v. Bramwell Inv. Co., 80 Utah 52, 12 P.
2d 623 ( 1932), the Court found no fraud on the part of
the defendant but in doing so relied to a considerable
extent on the fact that there was no relationship between
the parties which entitled Plaintiff to rely upon the statement made to him. The court said:
"The representations that the note ·was 'as
good as gold,' and that the inYestment company
would see that the plaintiff 'did not lose a penny,'
in and of themselYes; are matters of mere opinion, exaggerated statements, and trade talk, and
not actionable. So far as 'made to appear, the
pla.intiff and tl1e int:estment company dealt at
arm's length 1cith equal means of knotvledge,
dealing 1t'ith each other on equal terms and free
from. a.nd wninflueuccd by any fiduciary or trust
relation. Before the plaintiff purchased the note,
she intervie"\ved the \rhites "\Yith respect to it. Up
to the time of the purchnse of the note, the \Vhites
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had kept up their payments on the contract, and
that she was satisfied with their ability to pay the
note. Not anything is shown or made to appear,
nor is there any claim made, that the plaintiff had
not equal means with the investment company
to find out the financial responsibility of the
Whites, nor is it shown or made to appear or any
claim made that there was anything with respect
to their financial responsibility or inability to pay
the note which was peculiarly within the knowledge of the investment company and not of the
plaintiff, or that any such matter was withheld
from the plaintiff by the company." (Emphasis
supplied)
In the instant matter the Plaintiff testified not only
that he placed confidence in the defendant, who was the
president and manager of a savings and loan institution,
but actually asked Defendant's advice as a financial
adviser and stated to Defendant, Plaintiff was willing
to act upon such advice. (Tr. 174, 176, 186)
In addition to the foregoing cases decided by our
own Supreme Court, there is considerable other authority
on the matter which we feel supports Respondent's position. In 23 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Section
28, page 785, appears the following:
"The distinction between fact and op1n10n is
broadly indicated by the generalization that what
was susceptible of exact knowledge when the statement was made is usually considered as matter of
fact. Representations in regard to matters not
susceptible of personal knowledge are generally to
be regarded as mere expressions of opinion, al33
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though they are made positively and as of the maker's own knowledge. Usually, also, to say that a
thing is only matter of opinion imports that it is
unsusceptible of proof. The mere fact that a statement takes the form of an expression of opinion,
however, is not always conclusive. A statement
may be so expressed as to bind the person making
it to its truth, although stated in the form of an
opinion, a;nd conversely, that a matter which neces. sarily rests in opinion is stated positively does not
make it a statement of fact." (Emphasis supplied)
In an annotation in 51 A.L.R. at Page 94 appears the
following statement:
''The doctrine that fraud cannot ordinarily be
predicated on unfulfilled promises or statements
as to future events has been applied, or at least
recognized as applicable, in various cases where
the representation was as to the profits or amount
of sales which the other party would make if he
entered into the contract in question. It seems that
the rule is especially applicable to this class of
cases, since a statement as to future profits necessarily involves many elements of uncertainty, and
should in ordinary cases be regarded as a mere
expression of opinion on part of the person making
it. But it also seems that the misrepresentations
may easily amount in such cases to misstatements
of fact, and that fra.'lfrd may be predicated on a
statement regard·ing future profits, if the person
making it has no reasonable grounds on whi.ch to
base it, and has no honest belief in its truth, but
makes the statement merely for the purpose of
misleading a11d defrauding the other party;
as, where a business sold is being conducted at a
loss, and the positiYe assertion is made by the seller to the purchaser, to induce the purchase, that
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the latter will receive large profits therefrom. This
may be construed as a misrepresentation of existing conditions.'' (Emphasis supplied)
In a later annotation (27 A.L.R. 2d at page 38) appears the following:

'A vague statement that a property or business is 'profitable,' or a 'money-maker,' or the
like, may sometimes be treated as one of fact.
''For example, a statement by the owner and
operator of a resort hotel to a prospective purchaser that he is making' good money' in the business, whereas he has never made a profit in any
season, cannot be regarded as 'mere puff talk' of
an enthusiastic salesman but is a statement of fact
by one who knows the facts to one to whom the
facts are not readily available. Spies v. Brandt
(1950) 230 Minn. 247, 41 NW2d 561, 27 A.L.R. 2d
1, wherein there were more specific statements as
to past and future profits.

"A representation that a new corporation 'is
a good paying proposition and a good going concern' was held to be fraudulent in Community
State Bank v. Day (1923) 126 Wash. 687, 219 P.
43, where made by the cashier of a bank to induce
plaintiff to buy stock, it appearing that the cashier
then knew that the corporation had mortgaged
all its assets to the bank only a few days before
and that the corporation was not making money
and was not paying its bills in the ordinary course
of business.
"In Sherman v. Smith (1918) 185 Iowa 654,
169 N.W. 216, the court held that statements that
a corporation was doing a good business and was
making money and that the builder of the business
had a fine business and was doing well therein,
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being made to induce plaintiff to buy stock in the
corporation, could not be classed as nonactionable opinions if the speaker knew that the corporation had been doing business at a loss, was largely in debt, and had been compelled to borrow
money to pay its debts and running expenses.
''A representation that a mining lease was
'paying expenses' was held to be one of fact in
Beard v. Bliley (1893) 3 Colo. App. 479, 34P. 271."
The courts have also held that matters which are
generally considered opinionative statements may nevertheless be fraudulent under facts similar to the present
case in establishing fraud found in Paragraph 4 (B)
and (D) of the Findings (R. 27). See 23 Am. Jur.,
FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 29:
''There are many qualifications and modifications of the rule that actionable fraud cannot be
based upon the mere expression of an opinion.
Frequently, even a false assertion of an opinion
will amount to a fraud, where under the circumstances the other party has a right to rely upon
what is stated or represented. Thus, an expression of opinion may amount to fraud where it is a
mere contrivance of fraud, where the person to
whom it was expressed has justly relied upon it
and been misled, or where it is coupled with other
circumstances, as where it is accompanied by
active fraud or concealment.
'' ... Moreover, where a speaker asserts as a
fact something which forms material inducement
for a transaction, he cannot complain, if his assertion is treated as factual matter, although if expressed as an opinion it would not be actionable.
If a vendee relies on the representations of the
vendor and acts upon the faith thereof, without
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relying on his own judgment or opinion, and this
is known to the vendor, the latter cannot shelter
himself under the pretense that his representation
was a mere expression of opinion, when it is discovered to be false.
"Where a statement consists in part of opinionative matter and in part of factual matter, although the whole statement formed the inducement
to engage in the transaction, a charge of fraud is
maintainable if the factual part was false to the
knowledge of the speaker, or the whole was a comingling of fiction and opinion expressed with the
intent of deceiving. A statement which by itself
might be a mere expression of opinion may be so
connected with a statement of a material fact
as to amount to fraud. In other words, it has been
held that the rule that no one is liable for an expression of an opinion is applicable only when the
opinion stands by itself as a distinct thing, and is
intended to be taken as distinct from anything
else.''
Also:
"It is settled that an expression of opinion
may, under many circumstances, amount to fraud
where there is a relation of trust and confidence
between the parties. A fidiciary relationship between the parties imposes upon the one who is
trusted a duty not only to state truly all matters,
whether of fact or of opinion, but also to disclose
all material facts and even his opinion as to the
present or prospective value of the subject matter, etc.
"In order to hold one liable for fraud for the
expression of an opinion, the relationship between
the parties need not be a formal fiduciary or confidential one in all instances, such as the relation-
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ship of trustee and cestui que trust. It is sufficient
that the representor had superior knowledge, and
knew that the representee confided in him a;nd
was guided by his opin.ion. Even matters of opinion may amount to affirmation, and be the inducement to a contract, especially where the parties are not dealing on equal terms, and one of
them has, or is presumed to have, means of information not equally open to the other. Hence, the
rule is that if the person expressing the opinion
possesses superior knowledge, and it is a justifiable conclusion that he intended untruly to imply
that he knew facts such as would justify his opinion, his opinion may be regarded in law as an
assertion of fact and not honestly entertained.''
(Ibid Sec. 30)
While the areas of fact and opinion are not clearly
delineated, it does seem clear that where there is a fair
question as to which a statement is, the matter must be
submitted to the jury as a question of fact. See 24 Am.
Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Section 293:
''A statement may be so clearly the expression
merely of the opinion of the person making it not
to be relied upon as a representation of fact that it
may be held as a matter of la-w not actionable as
a false representation constituting a fraud. Thus,
it has been held error to submit to the jury the
question wherther a representation by the vendor
of lands that they contained large deposits of oil
was understood as a rna tter of opinion or a representation of a fad as ·within the vendor's knowlege, where the land had never been tested and the
matter therefore necessarily rested in opinion.
It is, however, often impossible to state as a matter
of law whether a statement is an expression of the
opinion of the speaker or a representation of fact
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to be relied upon as made within his knowledge,
and when such is the case, the question is one of
fact ... " (Emphasis supplied)
See also Baird v. Eflow Investment Co., et aZ., supra.
In the case of J. C. Miller Estate, Inc. v. Drury, 120
vVash. 694, 208 P. 77, it was held that representations
that bank stock was of the value of $125.00 per share and
was earning a 10 per cent dividend, and that the bank
was in a prosperous condition, when in fact the dividends
had been paid out of capital and the bank failed four
months after the transactions, were material in establishing fraud.
Appellant in his argument has attempted to minimize
the effect of the several representations made by him by
isolating each and asserting that standing alone such representation is not sufficient. In the first place, we do not
agree that any representation is inadequate on which to
base a finding for Plaintiff but in any event the representations in this case are interrelated.-The statement that
300,000 tons of ore were blocked out is not only a material
false representation itself but gives more body or substance to the representations that the mine was worth
more than $2,000,000.00 and therefore an offer for that
amount had been refused.
Although Appellant seems to have trouble with the
phrase "fine condition" as used in Finding No.4 (C) no
snch question existed in the mind of Appellant's witness
Pierce who was asked on cross-examination:
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"Q However, you would not state that in each
one of these years, 1950, 1951, or 1952 that
the mine was in fine condition and working
fine, would you~

"A The plant never worked fine.

"Q And in 1950, after the plant got into operation, and in 1951 and 1952, you would not be
in a position to state that the uplant was ever
paying its bills from the income it was receiving from the operation, would you~

"A No, no one asked me ; no one asked me if the
mine was running fine, or if the plant was
running fine.

"Q When you say 'no one asked you,' what"A I mean other than those who were in the
actual operation- Mr. Romney, Mr. Duvall
-of course, we could see. I knew from the
trouble we were having with the plant, that
it was not running fine.

"Q And when you say it was not running fine,
you discussed this with
knew it was not~

~1:r.

Duvall so that he

"A Certaintly he knew.'' ( Tr. 290)
This Court, in J(innear, et al. \. Pro2cs, 81 Utah 135,
16 P. 2d 1094, held that the alleged representation that,
''. . . stock paid dividends of 10 per cent annually was
such a material representation \Yhich, if false and relied
on, would support an action for fraud.'' The court also
went on to hold that a representation to the effect that
stock was not assessable when in truth and in fact it was
would be be material and would support an action in
fraud.
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In De Frees v. Carr, 8 Utah 488, 33 Pac. 217, the
court held that a representation by the defendant that a
company had made $5,659.70 profits during a certain
period and that plaintiff's share of this amount would
be $943.28, when in truth and in fact the company was
insolvent, were material and relief should be granted
even though the plaintiff might have informed himself
as to the facts but did not.
VI. ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT.
Appellant complains that the trial court did not
make adequate and sufficient findings. While the trial
court must make findings upon all material issues raised
by the pleadings, there is no requirement that the court
make any findings on matters not raised by the issues
and not in dispute during the trial. First, as stated by
Appellant the uncontradicted evidence disclosed that the
company discontinued operations after mining only 113,000 tons of ore. This was one of the points used by
Plaintiff-not Appellant-to establish that the representation that 300,000 tons of ore was blocked out was
false. In other words, the fact that only 113,000 tons of
ore was mined indicated that not in excess of that
amount had ever been blocked out and that the Defendant was aware of the extent of the ore body sufficiently
so that he could not in good faith represent that 300,000
tons of ore had been blocked out. It was unnecessary for
the court to make the specific determination that only
113,000 tons of ore had been mined because the court
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found that the representation that 300,000 tons of ore
had been blocked out was in fact false.
Second, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant represented that there had been 300,000 tons of ore blocked out
''ranging in value from $4.20 per ton to $50.00 per ton
and that said ore averaged not less than $7.00 per ton,
when in truth and in fact, said Defendant well knew that
the diamond drilling of said property had not resulted in
finding ore of commercial value, and that in no event
had more than 200,00 tons of proven and probable ore
been blocked out.'' (R. 16) The Court, in finding the repres~ntation to have been made in respect to this matter,
found that Defendant represented "that said Duvall
Mining Company had, as a result of diamond drilling
and tunnelling, blocked out 300,000 tons of ore containing gold ranging in value from $4.20 per ton and less,
to as high as $50.00 per ton when in truth and in fact
Defendant well knew that only 200,000 tons of proven
and probable ore had been blocked out." (R. 27) "While
the Court did not find the representation to ha\e been
made exactly as it was alleged in the complaint, nor did
the court find that all of the representation made was
false it nevertheless does not follow that the Finding is
defective in this respect. If anyone '"ere entitled to
complain of such Finding it "·ould be the Plaintiff since
the Court might well haYe found that the ore blocked
out was not of commercial Yalue in the light of the testimony which showed that the average assay of the ore
was approximately $5.50 per ton while the cost of mining
the same was in excess of $7.00 per ton. Certainly ore
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which is of less value than the cost of mining the same
is not commercial ore.
Again, Appellant complains because the Court did
not make any finding in respect to what happened in so
far as replacing the money which Plaintiff had used to
make the initial loan to the Duvall Company. According
to the testimony, Plaintiff issued to the Duvall Company
his personal check in the amount of $5,000.00 Approximately six months later he withdrew the $5,000.00 on
deposit with the Defendant's savings and loan institution and put the money back into his personal and business account. There was no issue raised in respect to
this rna tter ; and how the making of any finding as requested by Defendant could have affected the conclusion or judgment in the case is beyond our comprehension. The Plaintiff loaned the Duvall Company
$5,000.00 at the request of and upon the representations
made by Defendant. The $5,000.00 was never returned
and at the time the loan was made there was no possibility of repaying the money because of the hopeless insolvency of the Company. It had no assets of value
except for some items of equipment which had been substantially depreciated. It was indebted not only on open
account for thousands of dollars but to note holders in
the approximate amount of $300,000.00 ; and its stock
was worthless.
Appellant further asked the Court to find that
money loaned to the Duvall Company was money which
belonged to Plaintiff and his wife jointly. This the Court
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refused to do having already found in Findings No. 3
and 5 that the money was loaned to the Duvall Company
by the Plaintiff.
The last group of proposed findings submitted by
Defendant related to the matter of the value of the note
and security given by the Duvall Company. By its request No. 21, Defendant asked the Court to find that the
shares of stock in the Duvall Company received by the
Plaintiff were not without value. The Court found that
"said stock was at the time of said delivery worthless
and of no value." (R. 28) It, therefore, could not find
that such stock did have value. To the same effect was
requested Finding No. 22 where the Court was asked to
find tha:t the loan and the note given by the Duvall Company was not without value. This again the Court refused to do having found in Findings No. 7 and 8 that
the Company was insolvent and unable to pay the note
and that the stock was without value and that the only
amount which the Plaintiff receiYed on account of the
transaction was the sum of $336.00, which was received
after liquidation of the equipment, about March 6,
1958. (R. 28)
Appellant argues that the word "insolvency" is not
a sufficient finding in respect to the question of the value
of the note. It was not only found by the Court that the
Company was and is insolYent, but also, that it was unable to pay the amount of the advance. If it was not
able to pay the amount of the adYance and the security
given in connection therewith was worthless it is obvious
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that the note was likewise worthless. No person will, if
he is aware of the true facts, make a loan to an insolvent
company who cannot repay the loan and take in connection therewith stock or other property of no value.
It is respectfully submitted that the court did not err in
refusing to making findings as requested by Appellant.
VII.

ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY ON PROOF
OF DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF.

Appellant claims there has been no proof of damage by Respondent in this matter. Apparently the fact
that Plaintiff lost $5,000.00 as well as the benefit of the
use of the money and the 500 shares of stock in the Duvall Company which was represented to be worth in
excess of $14,000.00 does not seem to satisfy Defendant. The Court in its Finding No. 9 held :
''By reason of the false and fraudulent representations made to him by the Defendant herein,
Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $5,000.00;
plus interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum
from December 21, 1952, less the amount received
by Plaintiff from the liquidation of the assets of
the Duvall Company in the sum of $336.00. ''
(R. 28)
This Finding of damage is adequately supported by
the evidence and no citation of authority is necessary to
support the same.
However, Appellant makes the statement in his brief
that it is necessary for this court to establish a theory of
damages in regard to fraud cases. He then quotes the
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rule which was enunciated in the case of Hecht v. Metzler,
14 Utah 408, 48 P. 37, which states that damages in a
fraud action should be computed as if the case were being
tried the day after the contract was entered into. There
is no reason to assume that this theory was not used by
the trial court in this case. Appellant then cites the Vermont case of Crowley v. Goodrich, 44 A 2d 128, and quotes
from that decision the following:
'' ... it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to allege
and prove that it was not collectible at the time the
loan was made because of the insolvency of maker
or for any other sufficient reason.'' (Emphasis
supplied)
Every a cursory look at the several financial statements of the Duvall Company during the period in question (Exhibits E, K, P, Q and T) will reveal that the
now defunct Duvall Company was insolvent on December
21, i952, the time when the loan was made to defendant,
and could not repay any portion of the loan. Respondent
has therefore fulfilled the requirement set up by the Court
in the Crowley Case.
Appellant states that a casual examination of the
Company's financial statement dated December 31, 1952,
WOUld disclose SOme '' Yery tangible assets,'' yet it owed
$300,000.00 on notes which were due and unpaid, plus interest thereon, and could not pay its current bills (for
which latter purposes the loan "·as used) . ..A.pproximatel~
10 months later these "tangible assets'· were assigned to
the Intermountain Association of Credit Men ·who liquidated the same and paid only a few of the creditors, inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eluding Respondent, a nominal part of the amount owing.
(It must be remembered that most of the note holders
signed an agreement to subordinate their obligations or
there would have been substantially less recovery). (See
Exhibits 13 and T)
In measuring the amount of damages to be awarded,
the most familiar rule applied by the courts is the socalled "benefit of the bargain" rule whereby the injured
party not only gets back the amount which he has parted
with, but also the benefit of any bargain which he might
have otherwise obtained if the facts were as represented.
Thus, in the present case, part of the inducement and consideration for making the loan being the additional transfer of shares of stock in the Duvall Company, Plaintiff
would be entitled to recover not just his $5,000.00 out of
pocket loss, but he should also recover a further amount
equal to the reasonable value of the stock had the mine
been worth what it was represented to be. See 24 Am. Jur.
FRAUD AND DECEIT, Page 55, Sec. 227, where the
rule is stated to be :
''The great weight of authority sustains the
general rule that a person acquiring property by
virtue of a commercial transaction, who has been
defrauded by false representations as to the value,
quality, or condition of the property, may recover
as damages in a tort action the differences between
the actual value of the property at the time of
making the contract and the value that it would
have possessed if the representations had been
true. In other words, the defrauded party is entitled to recover the difference between the real
and the represented value of the property.''
47
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The Utah cases cited in support of this general rule
are Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227
P. 791; and Hect v. Metzler, supra.
Other Utah cases which have applied the same rule
are Kinrn.ear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P. 2d 1094, and
Pa.ce v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273.
However, where the representations are not of the
nature of expressing value, or where they induce the
expenditure of money by way of of a loan or otherwise
which would not have been made except for the misrepresentations, the courts have frequently used the rule for
measuring damages generally applied in tort cases.
The following quotations are taken from 24 Am. Jur.,
FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 217, et seq:
''As a general rule, one injured by the commission of fraud is entitled to recover such damages in a tort action as will compensate him for the
loss or injury actually sustained and place him in
the same position that he would have occupied had
he not been defrauded." (p. 47)
''Under general principles as to damage, an
injured party is entitled to recover in a tort action
such damages as result directly, naturally, and
proximately from fraud, including those which
were actually or presumptiYely within the contemulation of the parties when the fraud was committed. The recovery is restricted in all cases to
such damages as were the natural and proximate
consequenees of the fraud and such as can be clearly defined and aseertained.'' (p. 48)
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As stated by this Court in the case of Pa.rk v. M oarman Mfg. Compan.y, 121 Utah 339, 241 P. 2d 914:
''The fundamental principle of damages is to
restore the injured party to the position he would
have been in had it not been for the wrong of the
other party. ' '
In the case of U. 8. v. Ben Grunstein and Sons Co.,
137 Fed. Supp. 197, the court stated:
''Indeed, if we look through the long line of
cases, both Federal and State, dealing with damages in common law fraud actions, so often alluded
to as conflicting, we find such conflict to be more
apparent than real. Every one of them, in essence,
attempts to give the person defrauded such damages as he can prove 'naturally and proximately
resulted from the fraud,' ... In cases where the
person defrauded can credibly and reasonably establish that which he would have received but for
the fraud, it is that which the Court gives him, less
that he has already received from the fraud doer.
In other cases where the evidence, as to what the
person defrauded has lost due to the fraud, has
been but speculative, so that he cannot credibly
establish such value, then such person is remitted
to what he can credibly establish he has lost, i.e.,
the contract price, less again the value of what
he has already received.'' ...
In White v. Gordon, 130 Ore.139, 279 P. 289, the court
held that the measure of damages for fraudulently procuring a loan on inadequate security was the difference
between the amount of loan and the value of the security
at the date of loan, with interest from that time.
49
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We submit that the Finding on damages is adequate
and that it is well supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis and discussion this
Court should determine that there was no error committed by the trial court. However, should there appear to
be any technncal error, Respondent respectfully submits .
that such error would not justify or require a reversal
of the Judgment. Rule 61 U.R.C.P. provides as follows:
"No error in either the admission of the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground
for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.''
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

H. NIELSEN
NIELSEN AND CONDER
Attorneys for Respondent
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah

ARTHUR
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